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BOOK REVIEWS 
Tm; LAW·OF CONTRACTS. Samuel Williston, \Veld Professor of Law in Har-
vard University. New York. Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1920. In four 
volumes. Vol. I, pp. xxiii, u55, Vol. II, pp. xxi, u57-2329. 
Considered from almost any angle this is easily the best treatise on the 
law of contracts in our language. 
Two outstanding features of the book are defended in the preface. "In-
cluded within it are large portions of what is contained in works on Vendor 
and Purchaser, Sales of Personal Property, Negotiable Instruments, Agency, 
Bailments, Carriers, Landlord and Tenant, Insurance, Suretyship, Equity, 
Master and Servant, Quasi-contract, Damages, Evidence. * * * The law of 
contracts * * * after starting with some degree of unity now tends to fall 
apart. * * * It therefore seems desirable to treat the subje:ct of contracts as 
a whole, and to show the wid_e range of application of its principles." This 
is a good text, hut herein is not the proper place for a homily on the rarely 
other than accidental hyper-departmentalization of our legal thinking. Many 
will regret that Professor Williston did not keep his work within the limits 
of greater cc;mvenience in view of the number of other excellent treatises on 
the collateral subjects mentioned but all will recognize that he was confronted 
with the necessity of choosing between two (under our present classification) 
necessary evils, whatever may be thought of the wisdom of the choice which 
he has made. 
The second aspect of the work defended in its preface is the amount of 
space devoted to legal analysis and criticism. This needs no defense. It, to 
the contrary, is the most valuable feature of the work-its principal and 
wholly sufficient justification. Eliminate it and the book would approximate 
the encyclopaediac vintage of which we suffer from no serious shortage. 
Here is a text-book at once comprehensive and! critical to a degree not infre-
quently attempted hut rarely attained. 
The author has adhered to familiar terminology in stating the results of 
his analysis of the cases. Of this something has been,1 much may be, and 
more will be, said. But two observations will be indulged in here. It is be-
lieved that the value of the book would have been added to if, by a judicious 
use of a more incisive terminology, sharper distinctions had been made in 
questions involving the difference between evidential as opposed to operative 
facts and between facts as opposed to their legal consequences. So also in 
situations where rights and powers need differentiating and factoring. How-
ever, the author might have gone to the opposite and more unfortunate ex-
treme. He might have so busied himself in merely translating familiar 
notions into a novel terminology as to have had left neither time nor energy 
2 Sec review by Professor Walter Wheeler Cook, 20 CoLUM. L. REv. 716, and by 
J>roie>sor Arthur L. Corbin, 29 YALE L. JR. 942. 
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for analysis. He has analyzed whatever may be thought of his analysis. In 
hunting for a better platter to bring it on, he did not forget to cook the goose. 
This treatise contains the author's third statement of his views on con-
sideration.' Few legal topics have been discussed so carefully by so many 
writers with such a multitude of conflicting conclusions. Professor Willis-
ton's final position viewed as a whole contains more good sense as to the 
actual results reached by the cases than does that of any prior writer. But 
the end is not yet. Discussion will follow discussion. Many will despair 
and some will suggest emancipation by abolition, thereby attaining the sublime 
in naivete. It may be, too, that some one sometime will content himself with 
the prosy task of preparing a really complete list of the many distinct senses 
in which the word "consideration" is· used by courts and academic writers 
whence by a bare possibility it may appear that most of the discussions of the 
doctrine of consideration hitherto had are comparable to an attempt to solve 
some simultaneous quadratics with the value of X therein subject to like 
change without notice. 
In this work, too, is to be found the most careful and accurate marshal-
ing of the decisions on contracts for the benefit of third persons. It would 
not have been surprising had Professor Williston's objections on principle to 
the results reached by the American cases abated: somewhat since his earlier 
discussion of this subject." Other subjects treated in Volume I are formal 
contracts, capacity of parties, joint contracts, assignment and the Statute 
of Frauds. 
The first half of Volume II is devoted to general principles of contract. 
With the second half begins the discussion of special kinds of contracts men-
tioned in the preface, at which point interest recedes, again to mount when, in 
later volumes, we shall get Professor Williston's ideas on such general sub-
jects as impossibility, illegality and discharge. A noteworthy feature of the 
first part of Volume II is the author's treatment of so-called conditions implied 
in law in bilateral contracts. He prefers to find the logical basis for such 
conditions in the fact that, just as the promises were the agreed exchange 
each for the other when the contract was formed, so also the performance 
by each party is, in the contemplation of the parties, to be exchanged for the 
performance by the other party. § 813. It is to be noted that this theory 
rests upon what the contemplation of the parties was. In consequence it 
comes difficultly near to being the theory that so-called conditions implied in 
law are merely the courts' construction of the language used by the parties, a 
view which Professor Williston in the main rejects. § 8I3, Probably a 
proper use of the construction method of attacking these problems will take 
us farther in explaining the cases than is commonly supposed. Nevertheless, 
it is true that this theory will not account for all of them. We finally reach 
a point where we can no longer rely upon what the parties intended or con-
templated because numerous situations evolve to which by no stretch of the 
imagination can it be said that the minds of the parties ever adverted and 
2 8 HARV. L. REV. 27; 27 HARv. L. REv. 503. 
3 15 HARv. L. REV. 767. 
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hence, concerning which, they could not have had any intention or have 
indulged in any contemplation. 
To this theory the author adds a defense of the use of the term, failure 
of consideration. He admits that the content of the word, consideration, used 
in this connection is not identical with that of its use in stating the law of 
the formation of contracts. The term in both connections, he states, ex-
presses the common and general idea of "exchange" or "price." In like 
manner he sees accuracy in speaking of the consideration for a conveyance 
or other executed act. But he adds, "The requirements for legally sufficient 
consideration in one or the other case may differ, but that is another matter." 
Whence one of two things appear: (1) he is attempting to establish and 
defend one of the non-technical meanings of the word consideration, which 
is· no concern of lawyers, and is asking us, already lost in the maze of this 
word, to attempt to define a new .term, viz: "legally sufficient consideration," 
or (2) he has admitted the case against him.•• In this part of the law of con-
tract he and we need a distinct term because we have here a distinct idea to 
express. It would seem better to adopt a new term rather than further to 
abuse that already prostituted word, "consideration." The author himself 
witnesses to its uncertain character by himself using appositive expressions 
in the same section in which he attempts to defend the use of the term, failure 
of consideration. § 814 
Now for more general matter. The publication of Professor Williston's 
work on the formation of contracts is epochal in the development of the law 
of s~mple contracts. The opening of the nineteenth century found the courts 
under the· influence of a contemporary philosophy which laid undue stress on 
the will as a determinative in social relations. § 20. From this influence we 
inherited such notions as the necessity of a meeting of the minds and of an 
intent to contract for the formation of a contract. Then followed the devel-
opment of the notion that it was unreasonable to allow the existence of con-
tractual liability to turn at all on what the defendant thought at the time of 
the bargain if what he said and did reasonably indicated assent. Thus arose 
an insurgency against the earlier view and the attendant conflict characterized 
most of the latter part of the Nineteenth century. The crowning achievement 
of Professor Williston's work in this field is that his is the final and successful 
attack in the overthrow of this basic error with which we started. He has 
adopted what may be called the objective as opposed to the subjective test and 
has consistently applied it throughout his book. And it works. It accounts 
for the cases. It can now be taken as definitely settled that the facts opera-
tive to pro.duce contractual liability are to be looked for not in what the 
defendant thought but in what he said and did, reasonably interpreted. 
But what of the plaintiff? One gets the impression from reading Pro-
•• Other parts of the hook seem to indicate that the author proposes the adoption 
of the term, "legally sufficient consideration." See § IOI, for example. To admit that 
it is necessary to use such polynomials is to admit that the subject has no terminology 
of its own, or, at best, a very clumsy one, because there are equally cogent reasons for 
adding "legally sufficient" to the terms, offer, acceptance, and the score or more of 
other technical terms found in contract law. 
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fessor Williston's discussion that he has, consciously or unconsciously, adopted 
the objective test both in the case of a person seeking to escape contractual 
duties and liabilities and in the case of a person seeking to assert contractual 
duties and to exercise contractual powers. But these are distinct cases. Now 
we may find ultimately that the test is objective in both, but that cannot be 
assumed. Certainly there is nothing in the nature of things making that a 
necessary result. It may be true but we must not in our enthusiasm for the 
objective theory allow ourselves to be swept to an opposite extreme of error. 
Who knows? It may be that the old subjective theory is yet a half truth, 
wherefore its puzzling vitality. We may find: that one cannot assert rights 
and powers unless he was actually, as well as reasonably, led to expect the 
performance for which he sues, that upon such expectation he subjectively 
relied at the time the alleged bargain was made. 
A in jest makes an offer of a bilateral contract to B. B reasonably think-
ing A is serious accepts the offer. A sues B. A telegraph company raises 
the price named in an offer of bilateral contract of sale. The offeree-vendee 
accepts in ignorance of the error. The offeror-vendor learning of the mis-
take decides to hold the offeree to the higher figure. That B can hold A in 
the first case and that in the second case ~he offeree can hold the offeror 
where the error is in the opposite direction are applications of the thesis 
which makes Professor Williston's work monumental. But his work does 
not make a beginning toward the solution of the problem involved in the 
cases as stated. Is the test objective or subjective as to the person seeking 
to assert rights? That question is still ahead of us. 
Now suppose a promise offered for an act. The act is done but not done 
in reliance upon the offer. Nevertheless it is so done that to onlookers, the 
offeror among them, it is apparently done in reliance upon the offer. May 
the offeree hold the offeror? No assertion is now made that the test is not 
objective. It may be that it is and that the offeror is liable, but it is unscientific 
to assume so. The most ardent protagonists of the objective theory and the 
greatest admirers of Professor Williston's championship of it cannot read 
his attempt to apply it to this situation and wholly escape a feeling that the 
effort is labored to say the least. § 67. It is commonly said that the act asked 
for by the promisor must be done by the actor in reliance upon the offer. 
Is it not possible that that means that the act must be caused by the offer? 
If so, how can action be caused except by an antecedent state of mind induced 
in the actor and that, too, an actual, real, or subjective state of mind, not an 
apparent one? 
Back to bilateral contracts. Another pure abstraction kindred to the one 
just discussed which descended upon us from the introspecionists of the early 
Nineteenth century is that off yonder somewhere in space is a thing called 
a bilateral contract which, if it exists at all, automatically binds both parties 
or binds neither; that the group of facts operative to bind one party is, in 
some mysterious way, inherently and necessarily identical with the group of 
facts operative to bind the other party. Now it may be that men do live and 
move in the body of such an all-pervading and mysterious principle and it 
may be that they do not. Professor Williston says, § 92, "Nothing is more 
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fundamental thiln that in bilateral contracts both parties must be bound or 
neither * * *." That may be so but the assertion is ventured that, at this 
stage in our investigations, the proposition as stated is a pure assumption and 
it is unfortunately made because, if accepted, further inquiry ceases. Nothing 
so fundamental can be assumed. The cases must be e.xamined. If we recall 
that in ou~ law parties to a contract do not litigate their relations each to the 
other simultaneously, we should not be surprised to find what is the fact, 
viz., the decisions do not make this a closed issue regardless of the gen-
eralities indulged in by the courts and text-writers. A single line of inquiry 
is suggested. Dividing a normal or usual acceptance into its factual elements 
we have: (a) a state of mind of assent, (b) an external act, (c)_ expres-
sive of that state of mind, ( d) · of such a character as to come to the 
knowledge of the offeror. Advancing from a to d, what is the minimum 
necessary to render the transaction legally operative if (1) the offeree is 
suing the offeror, (2) if the parties to the action are reversed?' May the 
offeree vary from the offer as to (b), (c), and (d) according as he is suing 
or is being sued ?0 
No attempt has been made here to give even a partial catalogue of the 
cases in which it is material to determine (I) whether the test is objective as 
to both partie~ and (2) whether in bilateral contracts the groups of facts 
operative to bind the two parties are identical. No answers to these two 
questions are proposed. They are merely raised with a protest against assum-
ing their answers. 
Law students and the legal profession are deeply indebted to Professor 
\Villiston 'for his giving them the results of his long and careful investiga-
tions. His work abounds in sane and well-matured conclusions richly reward-
ing his great industry, patience and thoroughness. 
lliRMAN w. OLIPHANT. 
University of Chiccrgo Law School. 
TIFFANY oN REAI. PROPERTY (three volumes), by Herbert Thorndyke Tiffany, 
of Baltimore, Maryland. Chicago, 1920. Callaghan & Company. Pp. 
xxxii, 3666. 
The ordinary textbook in law which is really only a statement of the 
result of the cases is theoretically easy to write. The industry and patience 
to examine a large number of cases and the ability to use understandable 
English are the necessary qualities. There are, however, all too many of 
these ordinary textbooks. Only occasionally do we :find a writer rising notice-
ably above the disappointingly common mediocrity. There are too few Wig-
mores, vVillistons, and Salmonds. 
The writer of the noteworthy text must, of course, have the qualities 
mentioned-industry and ability to write,-but he must have something more. 
The ordinary writer can tell what the cases decided, the unusual writer does 
•The author's criticism of Hallock v. Commercial Insurance, 26 N. J. L. 268, for 
example, docs not consider the fact that in that case the offeror was suing the offeree. 
•See for example 'Vhe..:ler v.· Klaholt, 178 Mass. 141. 
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not only that but he draws sound inferences; the former makes use of the 
cases, but the latter understands the historical, economic, social, etc., back-
ground and is familiar with the literature and thought upon the subject; the 
former merely states results, the latter also weighs and tests them. The busy 
lawyer who is looking for "a case" may prefer the ordinary book-he uses it 
as a digest, but the lawyers and judges who play the largest part in shaping 
our law will trade a shelf full of such ordinary books for the one that has 
that additional something which makes it a real contribution to legal literature. 
It was in 1903 that Professor Tiffany published the first edition of his 
Real Property, a work in two volumes with 577 sections and 1323 pages. 
Although this book fell short of the really remarkable contributions to legal 
literature it was clearly one of the very best of the second class. The ar-
rangement which was essentially that of Gray's Cases on Property was very 
good and for conciseness and clarity of expression it would be hard to equal. 
This quality made it a popular students' book. The cases cited were to the 
point, and they were in sufficient number to make the book useful to practic-
ing lawyers. 
In 19!0 Professor Tiffany published his well known work on Landlord 
and Tenant, a really remarkably good book, one which in the reviewer's 
opinion is well entitled to rank with the best published in the last two decades. 
It is so much superior to the rest of the American works on the same subject 
that there is no basis for comparison. The author therein not only stated the 
result of the cases in his characteri,tic, clear style but he also critically ex-
amined and discussed their conclusions and the doctrines announced by 
the courts. 
The quality of the first edition of the Real Property and the excellence of 
the Landlord and Tenant led all students of the subject to look forward with 
no little anticipation to the announced second edition of the Real Property. 
By some it may be doubted whether this new edition is quit<! up to ihe rea-
sonable expectations aroused by these earlier works. It is quite likely that 
the book suffers by reason of its being mere!) a new editio11; the form 
had already been cast. 
To say that it is not equal to the Landlord and Tenant, however, is not 
to condemn it. On the contrary this new edition is an extremely valuable 
addition to Real Property literature. It is the old book brought down to date 
with additional citations and discussion and something more. In many in-
stances the content of the first edition is revised or amplified in the light of 
the later cases and the author"s further reflection, and in the notes refer-
ences are to be found to the wealth of material in the various legal periodicals, 
material not usually found by the practitioner. This is one of the most valu-
able features of the new edition. The additions and amplifications have ex-
tended the work to 677 sections and 3666 rather large sized pages; approxi-
mately thirty thousand cases are cited. The disappointment of the reviewer 
is not that the work falls short of being excellent, but that it does not come 
quite up to the expectations aroused by the author's own work on Landlord 
and Tenant. Unquestionably the present book is by far the best general text 
on the subject of Real Property. 
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It is of course obvious that in a work covering so large a. field as Real 
Property and of a size so large as the one under review the captious critic 
can point to errors in statement and omission and to failures to refer to cer-
tain authorities. Professor Tiffany's book is no exception. The errors, how-
ever, are few and relatively unimportant. Naturally there will be differences 
of opinion in many instances as to the soundness of positions taken by the 
author. But who could write a book as to which this would not apply? 
This review should not close without a word of appreciation of the work 
of the publishers. The three volumes though containing over thirty-six hun-
dred pages are not unwieldy, the paper being thin. The pages are pleasing 
to the eye and easy to read. Alt in all we feel the author and publishers are 
to be congratulated. 
RAr.PR w. AIGI,i;R. 
